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"The Gravest Natural
Solving
Resource Shortage You've Never
Heard Of"': Applying Transnational
New Governance to the Phosphate
Industry
ABSTRACT

Experts believe that global reserves of phosphates, an
essential and irreplaceable ingredient in fertilizers, will only
last another fifty to one hundred years. Although the
consequences of a phosphate shortage include a global famine
and decreased world population, the phosphate industry today
operates with little concern for sustainable mining and use of
the resource. Because the current system of international
governance is neither raising awareness of the looming
phosphate shortage nor incentivizing phosphate-industry
members to act sustainably, the future of phosphates and of food
security depend on a decentralized system of internal industry
governance known as Transnational New Governance. This
Note analyzes the current regulatoryframework before walking
through the barriers and steps in industry adoption and
implementation of the TransnationalNew Governance scheme.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Environmental scientists believe that global production of
phosphates, an essential nutrient for fertilizer and food production,
will not meet demand within forty years, leading experts to call the
future of phosphates "the gravest natural resource shortage you've
never heard of."' Despite the threat of a phosphate shortage, which
would lead to increased global hunger,2 the countries and
corporations involved in the phosphate industry operate under little
concern for phosphate sustainability. 3 The global lack of concern for a
phosphate shortage stems from the industry's shortsightedness, 4
scientific uncertainty and debate around the time frame of a
phosphate shortage,5 and existing industry arrangements, which are
incompatible with the natural phosphorus cycle. 6
Operating with little regard for the looming phosphate shortage,
the countries and private firms that control the resource focus mostly
1.
See James Esler & Stuart White, Peak Phosphorus, FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr.
20, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/20/peak-phosphorus?page=0,0
(relying on analysis from scientists at the Global Phosphorus Research Initiative).
2.
Dana Cordell & Stuart White, Peak Phosphorus: Clarifying the Key Issues
of a Vigorous Debate About Long-Term Phosphorus Security, 3 SUSTAINABILITY 2027,
2036 (2011); see also Esler & White, supra note 1 ("If we fail to meet this challenge [to
adopt sustainable practices in the phosphate industry], humanity faces a Malthusian
trap of widespread famine on a scale that we have not yet experienced.").
3.
See Dana Cordell, Jan-Olof Drangert & Stuart White, The Story of
Phosphorus: Global Food Security and Food for Thought, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE
292, 301 (2009) (stating that "global phosphate scarcity is missing from the dominant
debates on global food security and global environmental change").
4.
See id. (explaining that decision makers are only looking five to ten years
into the future).
5.
Cordell & White, supra note 2, at 2033-34.
6.
See Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 301 (referring to this
problem as "phosphate's lack of fit between ecosystems and institutions").
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on maximizing their short-term economic welfare. 7 This focus on the
short-term incentivizes firms and governments on both the
phosphate-importing and phosphate-exporting sides to resist
regulations governing phosphate sustainability and to avoid adopting
sustainability measures.8 Although international organizations,
including the United Nations and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), have imposed orders to facilitate the phosphate trade,
phosphate-controlling entities have challenged and ignored such
nonbinding policies.9
Given the failure of the current governance system to adequately
regulate sustainable phosphate supplies, this Note argues that the
future of phosphate depends on a system of internal governance
known as Transnational New Governance. Transnational New
Governance is a decentralized form of regulation that replaces the
traditional regulator, the state, with a variety of industry actors and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that adopt and enforce
business norms throughout a supply chain.' 0 The model's success in
the phosphate industry depends on the participation of phosphatemining firms, phosphate-fertilizer manufacturers, and farmers, as
well as peripherally interested parties, such as banks, investors, and
NGOs concerned with the social and environmental effects of the
phosphate industry.
Under the Transnational New Governance model for the
phosphate industry, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), a strong
advocate and past initiator of the Transnational New Governance
model in other industries," should invite phosphate-industry actors
and interested NGOs to a roundtable meeting. At the roundtable, the
parties collectively should set sustainability standards for phosphatemining firms, phosphate-fertilizer manufacturers, and farmers. After
the meeting, industry actors could adopt the agreed-upon
sustainability standards and, later, ask an NGO to verify that the
firms have met the standards and grant official "sustainable

See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J.
7.
ECON. 443, 445-46 (1997) (explaining the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting, which
causes firms to value present-day benefits over future benefits).
8.
See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2054-56 (1993) (describing the rationales that
guide players that operate in international environmental industries).
See infra Part III.A.2 (walking through UN and WTO regulations and
9.
decisions and examining their lack of success).
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International
10.
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration
Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 505-06 (2009).
Helen van Hoeven, Balancing the Earth's Budget, Q. UPDATE FIN.
11.
INSTITUTIONS, WWF MARKET TRANSFORMATION, Apr. 2010, at 1 (describing the WWF's
Market Transformation Program, in place in the palm oil, soy, cotton, timber, and
seafood industries, among others).
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phosphate" certification.' 2 The roundtable participants should then
require that sustainable-phosphate-certified industry members only
deal with other certified members across the supply chain. The
requirement would create a demand for the certification in the
industry and motivate other firms to seek sustainable phosphate
certification.' 3 The result should be a system of decentralized
governance that harnesses sustainability and human rights concerns
in the phosphate industry and creates strong incentives for
sustainability throughout the phosphate-fertilizer supply chain.
The global phosphate industry shares many features with
industries that have already adopted the Transnational New
Governance model, including dependence on various actors across a
supply chain,14 opportunities to improve sustainability at each step in
the production chain,' 5 and industry actors' sensitivity to
reputational threats.' 6 These parallels suggest that the phosphate
industry can conform to the model. However, the phosphate industry
also comes with unique problems that are unparalleled in existing
applications of the Transnational New Governance model. Most
significantly, phosphate reserves and the demand for phosphate
fertilizer are distributed in a way that may allow for three countries,
China, the United States, and Morocco, to exclude themselves from
the Transnational New Governance scheme.' 7 However, the countries
will likely not seize upon the possibility for self-exclusion because of
their concern for their reputations,18 a growing awareness of the
impending phosphate
shortage,' 9
and pressure from
the

12.
This requirement is copied from a similar requirement in the Roundtable
on Sustainable Palm Oil. See How To Be RSPO Certified, ROUNDTABLE ON
SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, http://www.rspo.org/en/how-tobe-rspo-certified (last visited
Apr. 10, 2013).
13.
See Benefits of Certification, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL,
http://www.rspo.org/enlbenefits-of-certification (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (explaining
the benefits of sustainability certification in a Transnational New Governance model).
14.
Keith Syers et al., Phosphorus and Food Production, 2011 U.N. ENVTL.
PROGRAMME Y.B. 35, 36 fig.1, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.26/INF/2, available at
http://www.unep.org/yearbook/201 1/pdfs/phosphorus-and food-productioin.pdf.
15.
See id. at 41-43 (describing sustainability steps that can be taken at each
supply-chain level).
16.
See No More Mosaic Phosphate Imports from Western Sahara, W. SAHARA
RESOURCE WATCH (Aug. 26, 2010, 9:10 AM), http://www.wsrw.org/index.php?parsenews=single&cat=105&art=1568 [hereinafter No More Mosaic] (giving an example of a
firm that changed its illegal practices after they were recognized by the Western
Sahara Research Watch (WSRW)).
17.
U.S. Geological Survey [USGS], Phosphate Rock, 2011 MIN. COMMODITY
SUMMARIES 118, available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/
phosphaterock/mcs-2011-phosp.pdf.
18.
See No More Mosaic, supra note 16 (illustrating that U.S. firms have
changed their illegal practices because of a concern for reputation).
19.
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing growing concerns over an impending
phosphate shortage); see also Tim Lougheed, Phosphorus Paradox: Scarcity and
Overabundance of a Key Nutrient, 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A208, A209 (2011)
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Transnational New Governance leaders in the global phosphate
industry.2 0
Part II provides background information on phosphates' role in
the global marketplace and describes the outlook on global supplies.
Part III explains why the current system of phosphate regulation has
failed to produce sustainability solutions and argues that
Transnational New Governance can organize fears of the shortage
into industry-wide sustainability regulations. Part IV draws parallels
between the existing applications of the Transnational New
Governance model and the global phosphate industry, explores the
unique challenges the phosphate industry presents to the model, and
concludes in an explanation of what the model would look like for the
phosphate industry. Finally, Part V walks through each step in the
Transnational New Governance model, tracing how it should be
applied to the phosphate industry.

II. PHOSPHATES AS A NECESSARY RESOURCE
Phosphorus is one of the three nutrients required in large
quantities for plant growth. 21 Low natural levels of phosphorus in
soils historically limited global food production and, thus, global
population. 22 However, during the Green Revolution in the 1950s,
people began mining phosphate rock, a nonrenewable resource found
in underground deposits, to create phosphate fertilizers.2 3 When
added to soils, the phosphate fertilizers increased soil yields. 24
Geologist Dale Allen Pfeiffer suggests that use of phosphate
fertilizers during the Green Revolution directly allowed Earth to
support five billion more people than its natural carrying capacity.2 5

(showing that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was concerned about American
interests in phosphates as early as 1938).
20.
Jason Clay, Senior Vice President of Market Transformation, World
Wildlife Fund, Address at TEDGlobal Convention: How Big Brands Can Help Save
Biodiversity (July 2010), available at http://www.ted.com/talks/jason-Clay how
big-brands-cansavebiodiversity.html (explaining how CEOs can "twist the arms" of
industry players in the New Governance model to promote industry sustainability).
21.
Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 292.
22.
Esler & White, supranote 1.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
DALE ALLEN PFEIFFER, EATING FOSSIL FUELS 9-10 (2006); see also Esler &
White, supra note 1 (explaining that phosphates made it possible to increase the global
population by 4.2 billion).
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A. The Global Phosphate Trade
Phosphate reserves are found in thirty-five countries,2 6 including
Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Israel, Russia, Senegal,
and Tunisia. 27 However, the vast majority of phosphate reserves are
found in only a few countries: Morocco, the United States, Algeria,
China, Russia, Syria, South Africa, and Jordan.28 Morocco alone
contains an estimated 85 percent of phosphate reserves, 29 making the
country the "Saudi Arabia of phosphorus."30
Since farmers around the world depend on phosphates, a global
phosphate trade has developed around the redistribution of the
resource, with about thirty million tons of phosphate moving across
the world in 2010.31 Chief exporters include Russia and Morocco,
while chief phosphate importers include Latin American countries.3 2
B. An Impending Shortage
Since phosphate rock is a nonrenewable resource,3 3 there is no
known substitute that can replace phosphorus's key role in
agriculture, 34 and "end of pipe" phosphate-recycling programs are
economically unfeasible,3 5 the world must rely only upon existing
reserves. However, the limited size of existing reserves, combined
with global phosphate demand, suggests that a phosphate shortage is
on the way. 36
From the supply side, there is debate over how long remaining
phosphate reserves will last.3 7 Estimates generally range from fifty to
one hundred years, 38 although, in an arguably flawed study,3 9 the

26.
Phosphorusand Food Production, supra note 14, at 36.
27.
USGS, supra note 17, at 119.
28.
Id.
29.
Id; cf. David A. Vaccari, Phosphorus Famine: The Threat to Our Food
Supply, ScI. AM., June 3, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?
id=phosphorus-a-looming-crisis (estimating only 40 percent of reserves are found in
Morocco).
30.
Vaccari, supra note 29.
31.
Production and Trade Statistics, INT'L FERTILIZER INDUSTRY Ass'N,
http://www.fertilizer.org/ifa/HomePage/STATISTICS/Production-and-trade (last updated
Feb. 15, 2012).
Id.
32.
J.J. SCHRODER ET AL., PLANT RESEARCH INT'L, REP. No. 357, SUSTAINABLE
33.
USE OF PHOSPHORUS 3 (2010).
Keith Syers et al., supra note 14, at 35.
34.
See SCHRODER ET AL., supra note 33, at 4 (reporting that "in the end only
35.
efficiencies close to 100% will make the use of phosphorus sustainable," yet these
necessary efficiencies do not seem realistic).
36.
Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 301 ("[A] global phosphate
scarcity crisis is imminent. . . .").

37.
DANA CORDELL, THE STORY OF PHOSPHORUS: SUSTAINABILITY IMPLICATIONS
OF GLOBAL PHOSPHORUS SCARCITY FOR FOOD SECURITY 36 (2010).
Id.
38.
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International Fertilizer Development Center predicts reserves will
last much longer. 40 Furthermore, policy constraints limit how much
phosphate may be mined from a given reserve and traded on the
global market. In Florida, for example, a federal court enjoined
operations at one of the United States' largest phosphate mines after
the Sierra Club challenged its permit to mine near wetlands.4 1 In
China, the government levied high tariffs on its phosphate exports,
effectively removing these phosphates from the global markets. 42 On
a global scale, two UN orders deter corporations and countries from
importing phosphates from the Western Sahara, where Morocco
exploits resources.4 3
Furthermore, the demand for phosphates is expected to rise as
the world population grows and global demands for food increase.44
Additional demands on phosphate reserves are expected to come from
the developing biofuel industry and from a wealthier average world
population that consumes more meat, requiring more phosphate
inputs per consumable calorie compared to a plant-based diet. 45
This Note accepts that, regardless of the exact date of depletion
of phosphate reserves, phosphate is a nonrenewable resource that
will run out. Something needs to be done to manage phosphate
resources because phosphate is a limiting factor in the multiplication
of human population 46 and a shortage will have severe consequences
even at current population levels. Studies suggest that a fertilizerfree plant could not sustain the current global population.4 7 In 2008,

Scholars have heavily criticized the International Fertilizer Development
39.
Center (IFDC) study, arguing that it may be economically infeasible to mine many of
the phosphate reserves that the IFDC accounts for because of low phosphorus
concentrations, increasingly difficult physical access, and impurities. Lougheed, supra
note 19, at A213; Dana Cordell, Stuart White & Tom Lindstrom, Peak Phosphorus:The
4,
2011),
REV.
(Apr.
SUSTAINABILITY
for
Humanity,
Crunch Time
http://www.thesustainabilityreview.org/2011/04/04/peak-phosphorus-the-crunch-timefor-humanity/.
40.
Phosphorus and "Peak Phosphate," INT'L FERTILIZER INDUSTRY ASs'N,
http://www.fertilizer.org/ifa/HomePage/SUSTAINABILITY/Phosphorus-peak-phosphate
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
41.
David Guest, Florida's Strip Mine Strong Arm, EARTHJUSTICE,
http://earthjustice.org/features/florida-s-strip-mine-strong-arm (last visited Apr. 10,
2013); see also Mosaic Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 34-35 (July 17, 2012)
(discussing the risk caused by Mosaic's dependence on permits from government
agencies).
Panel Report, China-MeasuresRelated to the Exportation of Various Raw
42.
Materials,WT/DS394/R (July 5, 2011).
See Esler & White, supra note 1 (Describing the Western Sahara as "a
43.
disputed independent territory that is occupied by Morocco and the site of growing
international human rights concerns").
44.
Id.
45.
Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 294.
Lougheed, supra note 19, at A212.
46.
47.
See PFEIFFER, supra note 25, at 7-8, 46 (describing how the use of fossilfuel-based fertilizers, among other technologies, led to the Green Revolution and

940

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:933

a phosphate shortage led to a rise in fertilizer prices, which
contributed to higher food prices and caused food riots in forty
countries. 48 Other consequences of a phosphate shortage include
increased geopolitical tensions resulting from a lack of food security
and increased global hunger. 49

III. TRANSNATIONAL NEW GOVERNANCE AS A REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR PHOSPHATES

Due to scientific uncertainty surrounding the timeline of a
phosphate shortage, actors in the phosphate industry have not yet
identified the inevitable phosphate shortage as a pressing concern.50
Thus, industry actors operate with little concern for using phosphate
sustainably, and international organizations, including NGOs, the
United Nations, and the WTO, have been unsuccessful in regulating
the phosphate industry thus far. This Part identifies the fatal flaws
in current phosphate policy before suggesting a new form of
governance for the industry.

A. How CurrentPoliciesAre Failing
Regulation in the phosphate industry is currently based on
International Old Governance.5 1 International Old Governance relies
on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United
Nations, which are tasked with creating regulations to govern
international behavior and transposing those regulations on
institutions.52 However, the nonbinding nature of International Old
Governance regulations,5 3 combined with a lack of concern around
the impending phosphate shortage, have been ineffective in ensuring
sustainable and ethical practices in the global phosphate industry.
This subpart outlines the flaws in current international phosphate
policy, illustrating the need for a solution outside the boundaries of
International Old Governance.

availability of crops to sustain the growing population, while a reduced use of fertilizer
has been shown to result in decreased crop yield).
48.
Esler & White, supra note 1.
49.
Cordell & White, supra note 2, at 2036.
Id. at 2029.
50.
51.
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 533 (describing the features of Old
Governance).
52.
Id. at 533-34.

53.

Id.
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An Underlying Lack of Concern

Global food security is a widely recognized concern, 54 and there
is a consensus that the world depends on phosphates for food
production,5 5 yet world actors have not yet identified limited
phosphate reserves as a global concern. 56 As of 2009, "phosphorous
scarcity ha[d] not received any explicit mention within official reports
of the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization, the International
Food Policy Research Institute, the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, the Global Environmental Change and Food Systems
programme, [or] the International Assessment of Agricultural
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development ... ."5 While a
focus on more immediate problems may explain the lack of attention
world actors are paying to the impending phosphate shortage,58 other
unique aspects of global phosphates reserves also contribute to this
lack of recognition.5 9
Uncertainty regarding the timeframe of a phosphate shortage is
the primary reason key decision makers have ignored the problem. 60
The uncertainty stems from a lack of consensus on key issues
surrounding the supply of phosphate reserves and the future demand
for phosphate.6 1 The most heavily debated issue is the long-term
availability of phosphate reserves.62 The fact that reserves are
underground makes it technologically infeasible to accurately predict
their size. 63 Even when reserves are estimated, these estimates often
are unreliable because scientists responsible for collecting data are
tied to a specific country's government, and thus lack both
independence and accountability. 64 There is additional uncertainty
surrounding parameters that will affect the future demand of
phosphate,
including population
growth, changing
dietary

54.
See Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 294 (discussing a global
commitment to decreasing world hunger).
55.
Cordell & White, supra note 2, at 2028.
56.
Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 294.
57.
Id. at 301 (citations omitted).
58.
Id. (explaining that decision makers are only looking five to ten years into
the future).
59.
See Cordell & White, supra note 2, at 2029, 2032-34 (walking through the
uncertainties surrounding phosphates).
60.
Id. at 2029.
61.
See id. (explaining the nature of some of the disagreements surrounding
the phosphorous industry).
62.
See id. (noting that arguments concerning the future availability of
phosphate form the core of most arguments about the future of phosphorous).
63.
See id. at 2033-34 (noting the many difficulties that impede accurate
estimates of existing phosphorous supplies, including the subterranean nature of most
reserves).
64.
See id. at 2034 (noting that countries have been known to manipulate their
reserve estimates for political reasons and have discretion over whether commercial
firms must disclose collected data).
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preferences, increasing demand for biofuels and electric vehicle
batteries, and farmland development in phosphorus-deficient
regions.6 5 Wide variations in predictions of these long-term trends
further complicate estimates of the life of phosphate reserves.
Another reason that the looming phosphate shortage has been
overlooked is phosphates' "lack of fit between ecosystems and
institutions," meaning that the resource is relevant to various global
sectors, but plays different roles in each one. 66 While phosphates are
scarce commodities in the agricultural sector, they are a pollutant in
the wastewater sector. 67 Phosphates' "lack of fit between ecosystems
and institutions" makes finding a solution to the impending global
shortage more difficult because it must be integrated through sectors
that see the resource in different lights. 68 And since phosphatesustainability solutions are integrated, yet peripheral, to each sector,
no one sector is willing to take on the responsibility to address the
issue. 69
Operating under a lack of concern for the impending phosphate
shortage, the countries and private firms that control the phosphate
trade seek primarily to maximize their own economic welfare in the
short-term. Behavioral economics predicts that firms value the
present more than the future, and studies confirm that phosphate
producers are only looking five to ten years into the future.70 Under
the hyperbolic discounting theory, firms are more likely to choose a
smaller-sooner reward than a larger-later reward because they
excessively discount future rewards.71 Applied to the phosphate
industry, the theory predicts that firms are unlikely to adopt
sustainability measures because doing so would be costly in the shortterm, and only beneficial in the long-term.

65.
See id. at 2033 (listing some of the factors that contribute to phosphorus
demand).
66.
See Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 301 (quoting Int'l Human
Dimensions Programme on Global Envtl. Change [IHDP], The Problem of Fit Between
Ecosystems and Institutions (IHDP Working Paper No. 2, 2002)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (noting the lack of phosphorous-related communication among the
different ecosystems in which phosphorous plays a role, and arguing that this lack of
communication hinders attempts to recognize and address the problem).
67.
See id. (noting the differing roles phosphorous plays in the agricultural and
sanitation worlds).
68.
See id. at 301-02 (quoting IHDP, The Problem of Fit Between Ecosystems
and Institutions (IHDP Working Paper No. 2, 2002)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (explaining why coordinating industries with different viewpoints is both a
necessary and a difficult part of addressing the phosphorous issue).
69.
See id. (noting the lack of incentives faced by individual sectors to address
the phosphorous problem).
70.
See id. at 301 (indicating that those charged with making decisions in this
area tend to look no further ahead than the next decade).
71.
See Laibson, supra note 7, at 445-46 (explaining the basic notion of a
hyperbolic discount function).
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Phosphate-exporting countries, most of which are part of the
developing world,7 2 are focused on producing more exports at a lower
cost.7 3 Less expensive exports attract private firms to invest in
operations, boosting the economies of these developing countries. 74
Because environmental regulations and sustainability measures are
costly to implement, they work against developing countries' shortterm economic goals. 75 Accordingly, phosphate-exporting countries
are not willing to implement sustainability measures and have
strongly resisted manufacturing regulations, fearing the regulations
will strip them of any comparative cost advantage. 76 In Morocco, for
example, the government agency that controls phosphates, the Office
Cherifen des Phosphates (OCP), states in its comprehensive plan that
it looks to double 2008 levels of phosphate production by 2015
through development of four new mines in areas with high-grade
phosphate reserves and to decrease costs through construction of a
new slurry pipeline.7 7 OCP's comprehensive plan contains no specific
strategies to improve sustainability or longevity of the resource.78
Phosphate-importing countries also do not naturally demand
that phosphate-exporting countries mine sustainably.79 An importing
country benefits from the lower prices of unsustainably mined
phosphates.8 0 Furthermore, importing countries do not incur the
negative externalities of the lax environmental regulations 8 ' because,
in the case of phosphates, the negative environmental effects of
mining are limited to the exporting countries.8 2 And while,

72.
See USGS, supra note 17, at 119 (listing data from phosphorous-producing
countries).
73.
See Stewart, supra note 8, at 2044 (noting that producers generally desire
increased production and lower production costs).
74.
See id. at 2044-45 (discussing the interplay between nations with strict
product standards and those with lax standards).
75.
See id. (discussing the effects of stringent regulations in countries within
the various development stages).
76.
See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers
in a Global Labor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 93, 105-06 (1999)
(explaining developing countries' resistance to a WTO proposal that would have
protected labor rights in the world trade regime).
77.

See 1 INT'L BUS. PUBL'NS, USA, MOROCCO MINING LAWS AND REGULATIONS

HANDBOOK 43 (2011) (describing the objective to "increase production capacity of
phosphates and derivatives through major investment programs of the OCP and
securing business opportunities through developing partnerships and commercial
contracts of long duration").
78.
See id. (lacking any mention of specific sustainability practices).
79.
See Stewart, supra note 8, at 2055 (describing the tragedy of the commons
as applied to natural resources).
80.
See id. (discussing the costs of adopting more stringent environmental
standards, thereby implying the benefits of laxer standards).
See id. (discussing how countries that implement stringent standards tend
81.
to bear all the costs of those standards).
See Syers et al., supra note 14, at 41 (demonstrating that phosphate mining
82.
can damage the environment around the mine itself).
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collectively, phosphate-importing nations should be interested in
conserving the resource through sustainable mining practices, a
classic collective-action problem known as the tragedy of the
commons predicts that a single nation will not demand
sustainability.8 3 The tragedy of the commons scenario explains that a
phosphate-importing country is deterred from demanding sustainable
phosphate imports because it would bear the costs of the regulation
while all nations would reap the benefits of longer lasting phosphate
reserves. 84
Finally, private firms on both the phosphate-importing and
phosphate-exporting sides are unlikely to implement or demand
sustainability measures in the phosphate industry. Phosphateimporting firms are discouraged from imposing sustainability
restrictions on exporting firms because they directly benefit from a
lack of restrictions, which leads to lower prices and higher production
levels, at least in the short-term. 85 Furthermore, a phosphateexporting company is unlikely to internalize the environmental costs
of its business on its own accord 86 because of pressure from poor
citizens in developing countries. 87 The citizens view environmental
quality as an unnecessary luxury88 and demand that economic
activity continue regardless of negative environmental externalities. 89
Thus, an effective solution to the impending phosphate shortage
must (1) account for the uncertainty surrounding the timeline of a
phosphate shortage and (2) overcome the phosphate industry's
natural incentive to resist sustainability measures. Proposed
solutions from IGOs and NGOs do neither. Their solutions urge firms
to implement sustainability measures without giving the firms any
90
incentive or reason to change their current, unsustainable practices.

83.
See Stewart, supra note 8, at 2055 (explaining the tragedy of the commons
as applied to environmental regulations).
84.
See id. (explaining that nations that take action to protect common
resources bear the costs of that action without being able to capture much of the
benefit).
85.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private
Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 963 (2007) (discussing an
environment in which companies do not impose restrictions on the companies with
which they do business).
86.
See id. at 919 (listing reasons a resource exporter might not bear the
environmental costs of its operations).
87.
See Stewart, supra note 8, at 2052-53 (explaining that a society's tendency
to demand environmental protections tends to increase as the society becomes
wealthier).
See id. (explaining that societies tend to treat environmental protections as
88.
luxuries rather than basic necessities).
89.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 919 (noting that a country's citizens
might prioritize economic activity over environmental protections).
90.
The UN Yearbook, for example, vaguely concluded that the next step
towards a solution is "more detailed research" and "an integrated set of policy options."
Syers et al., supra note 14, at 44.
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recommended

Limitations of the Current Governance Model

The uneven distribution of a scarce global commodity should
demand the attention of the international community.91 However,
international organizations are only beginning to show concern for an
impending phosphate shortage and have failed to implement
sustainability policies. 92 IGOs, such as the WTO and the United
Nations, have only stepped in to control phosphate trade in instances
of fair trade and human rights violations. But because the IGOs do
not have enforcement authority, countries have resisted and ignored
their regulations.
The WTO may only assert control over the phosphate trade when
such regulation is necessary to ensure fair-trade rights. In 2009, the
United States, Mexico, and the European Union brought suit against
China in a WTO forum.93 The countries claimed that China had
restrained exports of phosphates, among other raw materials,
through export duties, export quotas, export licensing, and minimum
export-price requirements.9 4 The WTO judgment stated that China is
prohibited from hoarding resources that the entire world is dependent
on because China had not properly demonstrated that it imposed the
trade restraints for the sole purpose of conserving raw materials. 9 5
However, China continued to impose high tariffs on phosphate
exports, effectively removing its phosphates from the global market,
while it appealed the decision. 96
The UN Human Rights Commission's Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights' requirement that
corporations "not engage in nor benefit from . .. violations

91.
See Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 301 (discussing the need to
direct international attention towards the phosphorous problem).
92.
In 2011, the international community finally brought attention to an
impending phosphate shortage when the United Nations published an article outlining
the issues surrounding phosphates in its annual Yearbook. However, the Yearbook
vaguely concluded that the next step towards a solution is "more detailed research" and
"an integrated set of policy options." Syers et al., supra note 14, at 44.
93.
Panel Report, supra note 42, at 1.
94.
Id. at 3.
95.
See generally id. (evaluating China's export restrictions in light of
applicable requirements).
96.
See China-MeasuresRelated to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/englishitratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds394_e.htm
(last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (explaining that in August 2011, China announced its
decision to appeal legal interpretations in the panel report rather than comply with the
WTO order).
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of ... human rights"9 7 also affects the phosphate trade. 8 In 1975, the
Moroccan government seized control of the Bou Craa phosphate
mine" in the Western Sahara, a territory in Western Africa with an
unsettled status.1 00 Morocco now uses the world's longest conveyor
belt to transport over three million tons of "stolen" phosphates back to
Morocco annually. 101 While Morocco earns over one billion dollars in
phosphate exports from the Western Sahara each year, Western
Saharans live in refugee camps and depend on foreign aid for
survival.102 And while the United Nations' Norms condemn the
Western Sahara phosphate exploitation, 0 3 the Norms have had little
authoritative basis in international law and are not followed.104
The United Nations has also confronted the human rights issue
in the Western Sahara by restricting exportation of phosphates mined
in the Western Sahara.105 However, the UN order is again not legally
binding, and shipping companies in China and Turkey, as well as
phosphate-fertilizer firms in Columbia, Australia, and the United
States, among others, have disregarded the order and continue to
import Western Saharan phosphates.106
Thus, the critical problem with the current system of
transnational governance is that no IGO has binding legal authority
at the international level.' 0 7 The IGOs' lack of binding authority will
likely not change, as states are unwilling to give up their

97.
Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, 55th Sess., Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 3, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
98.
See The Phosphate Exports, W. SAHARA RESOURCE WATCH (July 29, 2011,
2:23 PM), http://www.wsrw.org/all7x521 (noting the applicability of UN resolutions to
Western Saharan phosphate mining).
99.
See id. (explaining that Morocco invaded the Western Sahara in 1975 and
has taken control of the Bou Craa mine).
100.
See The World Factbook: Africa: Western Sahara, CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wi.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2013) ("A UN-organized referendum on the territory's final status has
been repeatedly postponed."). This Note does not take into account the possibility that
the Western Sahara may become part of Morocco, in which case Morocco's mining will
become completely ethical. Rather, this Note criticizes Morocco's past and current
mining in the Western Sahara, as the territory's status is unsettled.
101.
See The Phosphate Exports, supra note 98 (discussing Morocco's mining
activities in the Western Sahara).
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
See Peter Spiro, John Ruggie and 'The Norms," OPINIO JURiS (July 28, 2006,
2:04
PM),
http://lists.powerblogs.com/pipermaillopiniojuris/2006-July/000573.htm
(discussing the status of the UN Human Rights Commission's Norms).
105.
Esler & White, supra note 1.
106.
Id.; see also W. SAHARA RESOURCE WATCH, http://www.wsrw.org (last
visited Apr. 10, 2013) (view The "Companies" menu) (listing, by country, every firm
that has engaged in illegal phosphate imports from the Western Sahara).
107.
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 534 (discussing the powerlessness of
international organizations).
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sovereignty. 0 8 And, as demonstrated in the examples of China's
trade order from the WTO and the Western Saharan phosphateimport bans, as long as the IGO regulations are not legally binding,
countries will simply ignore them. 109
With no legal authority at the international level, the current
system of governance leaves power in the hands of individual
governments, which are unlikely to act in the interest of phosphate
sustainability.110 However, even if awareness of phosphate scarcity
grows and a phosphate-controlling country makes a choice to produce
or demand sustainable phosphates, its action probably would be
futile. Weak central governments in phosphate-exporting developing
countries lack the power to adequately enforce regulations on
industry."' And in phosphate-importing countries, demand for
sustainable products on a country-by-country basis is probably barred
by a WTO regulation that limits the degree to which a country can
impose process standards on imports. 1 2 Furthermore, developed
countries' unilateral international policy choices that affect
developing countries have been characterized as "arrogant,
patronizing, paternalistic, and racist.""s3
B. TransnationalNew Governance as a Solution
A solution to the phosphate shortage cannot rely on the current
system of Old Governance, with its ineffective IGOs and incapable
individual governments. Existing proposals have failed to find a
different framework for the solution and, therefore, cannot be
successful. Thus, this Note looks outside of the framework of
International Old Governance and suggests that the phosphate
industry turn to the system of Transnational New Governance.

108.
See id. at 534-35 (elaborating on the role international organizations play).
109.
See id. at 538 (discussing the incentives developing countries face to not
impose or enforce stringent regulation).
110.
See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text (explaining the unregulated
actions of phosphate-importing and phosphate-exporting governments).
111.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 919 (discussing various reasons firms
in exporting countries might be effectively unregulated)
112.
See id. at 921 (citing Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental "PPMs"
in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 59 (2002)) (explaining
the limitations the WTO places on importers).
113.
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 541 (quoting PARLIAMENTARY JOINT
STATUTORY COMM. ON CORP. & SEC., REPORT ON THE CORPORATE CODE OF CONDUCT

BILL 2000, at 16 (2001) (Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.aulParliamentary
Business/Committees/SenateCommittees?url=corporations ctte/completed inquiries/1
999-02/corp-code/report/report.pdf).
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An Introduction to Transnational New Governance

Transnational New Governance is a form of private governance
that has surfaced as the response to insufficient public regulation of
exporting firms' practices." 4 It does not depend on the traditional
regulatory role of the state." 5 Instead, the scheme is administered in
a decentralized way, relying on a variety of industry groups and
NGOs that work collectively to adopt and enforce business norms.1 16
The process typically begins when NGOs harness consumer
demands and present an industry with a credible threat of either a
boycott or a public campaign against firms acting in an undesirable
way." 7 Alternatively, a private firm may self-impose supply-chain
requirements because of pressure from investors or customers, as a
preemptive measure to avoid liability or governmental regulation, or
out of a desire to secure raw materials in the long run.1 18 In the late
1980s, for example, media attention on dolphins killed during tuna
fishing led to consumer demand for "dolphin-safe" labels on canned
tuna.1 19
Under the Transnational New Governance model, a concerned
industry actor next takes the lead to initiate a roundtable that
gathers together industry players at all level of the supply chain, as
well as peripherally interested parties such as NGOs, banks, and
investors. 120 At the roundtable, participants go through the process of
collective standard setting, 121 agreeing upon internal standards to
regulate activities. 122 The collective standards are translated into an
industry-wide certification program.' 2 3 NGOs independently review
the practices of individual industry firms and grant certification to

114.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 921 (explaining the impetus behind
private forms of governance).
115.
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 505-06 (discussing the role the state
plays in private governance).
116.
See id. (discussing the structure of private-governance schemes).
117.
Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 917 (citing Edward L. Rubin, Passing
Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 5-8 (2001)).
118.
See id. (listing various reasons a firm might impose standards on its supply
chain).
119.
See Mario F. Teis1, Brian Roe & Robert L. Hicks, Can Eco-Labels Tune a
Market? Evidence from Dolphin-Safe Labeling, 43 J. ENvTL. EcON. & MGMT. 339, 35557 (2002) (summarizing research surrounding the dolphin/tuna controversy).
120.
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 505-07 (discussing the roles played
by various actors in the private regulatory process).
121.
Collective standard setting is also known as "regulatory standard-setting"
and is defined as "the promulgation and implementation of nonbinding, voluntary
standards of business conduct in situations that reflect 'prisoner's dilemma' externality
incentives . . . rather than coordination network externality incentives." Id. at 506-07.
122.
Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 922.
123.
Id. at 922-23.
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firms that have adopted the standards. 124 Once certified, an industry
member is strongly encouraged to deal only with other certified
members across the supply chain; this is the only way to guarantee a
sustainable final product for consumers.125 Thus, even in the absence
of functional public regulation, growing demand for certified goods
across the supply chain induces other industry actors to seek
certification.1 26
One criticism of the Transnational New Governance scheme is
that, because it requires many different actors to play a part, it is
difficult to get every party to fulfill its individual role. However, the
coexisting systems of firms' reliance on other firms across the supply
chain and NGO credibility checks should not just pressure, but also
incentivize, all participants to carry out their responsibilities.
Furthermore, all parties will do their share if they believe in the
Transnational New Governance model.
i.

How Transnational New Governance Can Raise and Harness
Concerns in the Phosphate Industry

While there is widespread ignorance of an impending phosphate
shortage among the phosphate-controlling parties, peripheral and
less influential actors have found cause for concern in the phosphate
industry. Two NGOs, the International Plant Nutrition Institute12 7
and the Global Phosphorus Network,128 are advocates for worldhunger alleviation through sustainable phosphate mining. Other
organizations, such as the Western Sahara Research Watch (WSRW),

124.
This requirement is based off a similar requirement of the Roundtable on
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). See How To Be RSPO Certified, supra note 12 ("The
third party will be a RSPO approved independent certification body. Growers will be
assessed for certification once every five years, and if certified, will be annually
assessed for continued compliance.").
125.
See id. ("The principal objective of RSPO is 'to promote the growth and use
of sustainable palm oil through co-operation within the supply chain and open dialogue
between its stakeholders'.").
126.
See David Graham & Ngaire Woods, Making Corporate Self-Regulation
Effective in Developing Countries, 35 WORLD DEV. 868, 870 (2006) (citing M. Finnemore
& K. Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887
(1998)) (describing a "threshold" or "tipping point" at which sufficient numbers of firms
have adopted a norm for that norm to be seen "to specify appropriate behavior"); see
also Why Become a Member of RSPO, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL,
http://www.rspo.org/en/why-become-a-memberof rspo (last visited Apr. 10, 2013)
(explaining the benefits of certification).
About IPNI, INT'L PLANT NUTRITION INST., http://www.ipni.net/about ("The
127.
International Plant Nutrition Institute (IPNI) is .. . dedicated to the responsible
of
the
human
the
benefit
nutrition
for
of
plant
management
family. ... Membership . .. is composed of companies that are basic producers of one or
more of the major plant nutrients (nitrogen, phosphate, potash, and sulfur) for
agricultural purposes.").
128.
GLOBAL PHOSPHORUS NETWORK, http://globalpnetwork.net (last visited
Apr. 10, 2013) (proclaiming that "without phosphorus, we cannot produce food").
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seek to end exploitation of Western Saharan phosphates.' 29
Environmental groups, including the Sierra Club, are focused on
lessening phosphate mining's negative effects on ecosystems.13 0 A few
private firms, such as the Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative
Limited (IFFCO), have shown concern for small-scale farmers as the
phosphate shortage nears and phosphate prices increase.13 1 And
individual farmers struggling to purchase phosphate fertilizer at
current prices are deeply concerned about rising prices. 32
Individually, these peripheral and relatively powerless actors have
little ability to influence change in the phosphate industry. 3 3
However, under the Transnational New Governance model, these
actors can come together and harness the various concerns
surrounding phosphates to induce industry to adopt more sustainable
and ethical business practices.
Transnational New Governance's simple strategy for channeling
the dispersed concerns around an industry is a roundtable
meeting. 134 The roundtable meeting brings together all interested
parties, thus circumventing a key hindrance to finding a solution to
the various phosphate concerns-the fact that any one actor or sector
is unwilling to take on responsibility to address a shared issue.13 5 The
roundtable meeting's eventual solution can be integrated through all

129.
See The Phosphate Exports, supra note 98 ("Numerous U.N. resolutions
supports [sic] the conclusion that extracting and trading with phosphates from Western
Sahara are contrary to international law.").
130.
See Guest, supra note 41 (discussing a lawsuit filed by Earthjustice against
a mining firm and a county mining commission on behalf of, among others, the Sierra
Club).
131.
See Press Release, Legend Int'l Holdings Inc., IFFCO Strengthens Its
available at http://www.iffco.nic.in/ifc/web.nsf/
Global Cap (May 5, 2008),
d1bfbfe25add5f736525778a001e943b/b9f9a5344ab9e016652577c700289a7e?OpenDocu
ment (discussing favorably a deal between IFFCO and an Australian mining firm
under which the Australian firm provides IFFCO with three million tons of phosphate
per year).
132.
See Hannah Hislop, How Phosphorus Shortages Could Increase Global
Food Prices, ECOLOGIST, Oct. 28, 2011, http://www.theecologist.org/blogs-andcomments/commentators/othercomments/1110016/how-phosphorus-shortagesscould
increase-global food-prices.html ("Even at today's prices, farmers in developing
countries cannot afford phosphate fertilisers, and so under-apply, despite low soil
fertility.").
133.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 920 (discussing the difficulty that
citizens face in effecting policy changes in other countries).
134.
See Clay, supra note 20 (explaining the roundtable concept); History,
ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, http://www.rspo.org/en/history (last visited
Apr. 10, 2013) (explaining how the Transnational New Governance's application to the
palm oil industry began with a roundtable).
135.
See Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 301-02 (discussing "the
divide between the agricultural sector, where phosphorus is perceived as a fertilizer
commodity, and the water and sanitation sector, where phosphorus is perceived as a
pollutant in wastewater").
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sectors represented at the meeting. 136 And media coverage of the
phosphate roundtable should raise public awareness of the impending
phosphate crisis, strengthening pressure on industry actors.
One criticism of the model is that the collective-action problem
will deter any individual NGO, firm, or farmer from initiating the
roundtable. 137 However, the Transnational New Governance
movement brings supporters with it to fulfill the role of initiator. For
example, the WWF, although traditionally known for its work in
biodiversity initiatives, is a strong supporter of the Transnational
New Governance model through its Direct Market Transformation
Initiative and has previously initiated roundtables in the timber,
palm oil, and sugarcane industries.1 38
ii.

Advantages over the Current Governance Model

The primary advantage of Transnational New Governance is
that it escapes the current, unsuccessful transnational governance
system by relying on private actors rather than ineffective IGOs and
incapable individual governments.13 9 The dependence on private
actors is beneficial foremost because, unlike importing countries,
importing firms can easily demand imports with heightened
environmental standards. 140 Other advantages of the Transnational
New Governance system's reliance on private actors include increased
expertise and decentralized regulatory authority.' 4 '
The current model of transnational governance leaves the
complexity of regulatory problemS1 42 in the hands of a few
professional regulators, who often are disconnected from the industry

136.
See id. at 302 (discussing opportunities for interdisciplinary approaches to
solving the issue of phosphate shortage).
137.
Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 920 ("Citizens of importing countries who
hold preferences for reducing environmental harms in exporting countries face
collective action problems in inducing their governments to act.").
van Hoeven, supra note 11.
138.
139.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 920-21 (discussing the unavailability
and inadequacy of multilateral agreements and unilateral state action).
140.
See id. at 921-22 (discussing the greater power that private actors exercise
over transnational practices through private-market behavior compared to government
regulation).
141.
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 524-25 (discussing the decentralized
approach of New Governance and how this approach allows regulators to rely on
knowledgeable firms and NGOs).
142.

Because of the complexity of regulatory problems, multiple areas of
expertise are relevant: technical, regarding social or environmental
problems and regulatory solutions; normative, regarding social values
and the normative context; economic, regarding the operations of
target firms; and social, regarding the effects of regulation on intended
beneficiaries and the public.

Id. at 528 (emphasis omitted).
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or do not have the necessary expertise to set proper regulatory
levels.143 Transnational New Governance, on the other hand, employs
a variety of interested stakeholders from different backgrounds that
have direct knowledge of both industry and societal needs.144 The
scheme benefits from this expertise not only in setting regulations,
but also in enforcing regulation, since knowledgeable actors can
perform inspections more effectively. 145
Transnational New Governance also benefits from decentralizing
regulatory authority, leaving it in the hands of private actors rather
than in the hands of the government. 146 Taking regulatory authority
out of the hands of states is beneficial in an era when government
resources are constrained.14 7 Furthermore, decentralization leads to
more flexibility.148 While, in the current system, IGOs force uniform
rules on private actors with varied needs and local conditions,
Transnational New Governance allows for custom regulations.149 And
the Transnational New Governance system as a whole is allowed to
tailor regulations and make adjustments as regulators see necessary,
allowing for continued innovation.1so

IV. CAN THE TRANSNATIONAL NEW GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK APPLY
TO THE PHOSPHATE INDUSTRY?

Although Transnational New Governance appears to be capable
of regulating the phosphate industry more effectively than the
current governance system, skeptics may believe that unique aspects
of the phosphate industry will render it unable to successfully
implement the new governance system. This Part examines other
applications of the Transnational New Governance model to
determine whether the phosphate industry has the requisite
elements, explores unique challenges in the phosphate industry, and

143.
See id. at 528-29 (comparing the New Governance recognition of dispersed
expertise to the Old Governance strategy of relying on bureaucratic expertise).
144.
Id.
145.
See id. at 524-25 ("Decentralized regulation draws on the often greater
resources and capacities of private actors-for example, inspections of suppliers may be
more effective when performed by knowledgeable firms or NGOs than by public
inspectors.").
146.
See id. (discussing the decentralized approach of New Governance).
147.
Id. at 525 ("Decentralization ... reduces demands on the state, a
significant advantage in an era when many states and agencies face both shrinking
resources and growing demands for action.").
148.
See id. at 526 ("New Governance allows the state to work with regulatory
targets and other actors to tailor policies to their specific needs and local conditions,
rather than forcing uniform rules on disparate circumstances.").
149.
Id.
150.
See id. (discussing the advantages derived from the flexibility of New
Governance).
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New

A. Drawingupon Existing Applications of the Model
The Transnational New Governance model already has been
applied to other limited-resource supply chains, including the palm
oilI 5 1 and fishingS 2 industries. The adoption of the Transnational
New Governance scheme in these commercial sectors has positively
increased sustainability throughout the supply chains. Analyzing the
palm oil and fishing industries prior to the adoption of the
Transnational New Governance model reveals that there are three
elements critical to a successful application of the model: (1) a
multiple-step supply chain, (2) public concern surrounding the
industry, and (3) industry sensitivity to reputational threats. Because
the current phosphate-fertilizer industry contains all three elements,
the Transnational New Governance model is an appropriate model to
apply to the industry.
Because the Transnational New Governance model utilizes
demand for sustainability at one level of the supply chain to influence
practices at all other levels, the model can only succeed in industries
that involve various actors engaged in a series of steps. 5 3 For
example, the Transnational New Governance scheme's application to
the palm oil industry, known as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm
Oil, has been successful because of the participation of seven distinct
sectors of the palm oil industry: oil palm growers, palm oil processors
or traders, consumer-goods manufacturers, retailers, banks and
investors, environmental or nature conservation NGOs, and social or
developmental NGOS. 154 The phosphate industry meets the first
requirement for application of the Transnational New Governance
model because it contains various actors engaged in a series of steps,

151.
In 2004, RSPO was established to "to promote the growth and use of
sustainable palm oil through co-operation within the supply chain and open dialogue
between its stakeholders." Press Release, Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, New
Global Initiative To Promote Sustainable Palm Oil (May 8, 2004).
152.
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) "seek[s] to increase the availability
of certified sustainable seafood" and promote sustainable fishing practices. What We
Do, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/about-us/what-we-do (last
visited Apr. 10, 2013).
153.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 921-22 (describing different types of
action, including civic behavior, consumer preferences, and collective action by firms
and NGOs).
154.
See Who Is RSPO?, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL,
http://www.rspo.org/en/who isrspo (last visited Apr. 10 2013) (identifying the seven
categories of participants in the RSPO).
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including phosphate-mining firms, phosphate shippers, and
phosphate-fertilizer producers.15 5
The implementation of the Transnational New Governance
model also depends on public concerns about an industry, which are
necessary to pressure firms to participate in the initial roundtable
meeting.156 In the case of the phosphate industry, there is a growing
concern not only for scarcity of the resource,15 7 as there was in the
fishing industry, 5 8 but also for the environments in which the
resource is mined,' 5 9 as there was in the palm oil industry.160
Additionally, the phosphate industry is connected to wastewater
pollution concerns, human rights issues, and world-hunger
concerns.161 The number and variety of concerns revolving around the
industry increases the number of interested NGOs that will actively
pressure private actors to participate in a roundtable.
Finally, for NGOs to successfully apply the Transnational New
Governance scheme to an industry, that industry's members must be
sensitive to threats to their public reputation. NGOs and the public
can only be successful in pressuring industry actors to participate in a
roundtable and, later, to seek certification if the firms care about
their reputations. Firms in the phosphate industry have shown such
concerns, as demonstrated by their responsiveness to prior NGO
threats to their public image.' 6 2 The WSRW tracks Morocco's
shipments of phosphates from the Western Sahara and identifies
firms that import what the WSRW considers to be exploited
phosphates.' 63 By sending notices to the firms and making the public
aware of the practices, the WSRW successfully pressured large
phosphate firms to discontinue imports from the Bou Craa mine. 164
Phosphate-industry actors' concern for their public reputation
suggests that NGOs, aware of unsustainable practices in the

155.
See Syers et al., supra note 14, at 36 fig.1 (showing the various stages of the
phosphorous cycle).
156.
Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 917.
157.
See Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 294-95 (discussing the
growing demand for fertilizers and the decreasing world supply of phosphate rock).
158.

See MSC in Numbers, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL (Feb. 6, 2013),

http://www.msc.org/business-supportfkey-facts-about-msc (explaining that MSC was
created in a reaction to overfishing).
159.
See The Phosphate Exports, supra note 98 (discussing the human rights
implications of the Western Sahara phosphate-mining industry).
See Why Palm Oil Matters in Your Everyday Life, ROUNDTABLE ON
160.
SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL (Jan. 2013), http://www.rspo.org/file/250113-designfactsheetH+K.pdf (expressing concern for the ecosensitive forests where palm oil is cultivated).
161.
See supra notes 127-138 and accompanying text (describing the various
concerns revolving around the industry).
162.
See No More Mosaic, supra note 16 (giving one example of a firm that
changed its illegal practices after it was recognized by the WSRW).
163.
The Phosphate Exports, supra note 98.
164.
See No More Mosaic, supra note 16 (discussing the Mosaic Company's
practice of no longer importing phosphates from the Western Sahara).
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phosphate industry, and consumers, hoping for fertilizer price
stability, should be able to pressure firms into more sustainable
practices.

B. Challenges Specific to the Phosphate Industry
While three specific characteristics of the phosphate industry
suggest that the industry would fit well into the Transnational New
Governance model, the industry also comes with unique problems
that are unparalleled by the palm oil and fishing industries.
Phosphate reserves and the demand for phosphate fertilizer are
distributed in such a way that two countries, the United States and
China, do not export any of the phosphates that they minel 65 and one
country, Morocco, has a near monopoly on exported phosphates.1 66
This unique distribution of phosphate reserves could result in China,
Morocco, and the United States excluding themselves from the
Transnational New Governance model.
One key problem in applying the Transnational New Governance
model to the global phosphate trade is that the United States and
China use all of the phosphates that they mine domestically.167
Because China and the United States are self-dependent on the
phosphates they mine, their phosphate industry firms have no
interaction with other supply-chain levels in the global phosphate
trade. The Transnational New Governance model, however, utilizes
demand for sustainability at one level of the supply chain to influence
practices at other levels,16 8 and without such a relationship cannot
function properly. In other words, the lack of interaction between
importers and Chinese and American firms means that the importers
cannot pressure phosphate-industry firms in China and the United
States to join a roundtable or get certified under the Transnational
New Governance scheme. However, even without pressure from
international phosphate importers, firms in the Chinese and
American phosphate industry may still choose to participate in the
Transnational New Governance model.
Reputational and financial risks alone may be enough to
pressure Chinese and American phosphate firms into joining the
Transnational New Governance scheme. In 2005, Yara, a large firm
in the Norwegian phosphate industry, proved that it is sensitive to
reputational threats when it halted its phosphate imports from the

165.
David Gabel, The Coming Crisis in Phosphate Supplies, ENVTL. NEWS
NETWORK (July 20, 2011), http://oilprice.com/Metals/Commodities/The-Coming-Crisisin-Phosphate-Supplies.html.
166.
See Vaccari, supra note 29 (referring to Morocco as the "Saudi Arabia of
phosphorous").
167.
Gabel, supra note 165.
168.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 921-22.
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Bou Craa mine because of pressure from the WSRW.169 Yara later
announced that it would refrain from purchasing Western Saharan
phosphates, adding that Yara hopes that the country "will be
liberated one day, and then the inhabitants will benefit if we can
receive their phosphate quickly."' 7 0 Firms across the United States
and China probably will react similarly and alter undesirable
behaviors if NGOs begin identifying their unsustainable practices. In
addition to reputational pressure, financial pressure from investors,
who are increasingly screening firms for ethical and environmental
liabilities,171 should work to encourage phosphate firms in China and
the United States to participate in a roundtable meeting and to seek
sustainability certification.1 72
Furthermore, the self-dependence of China and the United
States on their own, limited supplies of phosphates, while working
against their participation in the Transnational New Governance
scheme in one regard, may actually work to encourage their
participation in another regard, as it should cause them to be selfinterested in sustainability measures.' 7 3 As President Franklin D.
Roosevelt said to Congress in 1938, "The disposition of our phosphate
deposits should be regarded as a national concern." 174 At current
rates of mining and consumption, the United States' most productive
mine will be depleted within twenty years. 7 5 But by self-imposing
sustainable practices, the United States can delay the depletion,
reducing its future dependence on foreign nations for phosphates.
Based on its efforts to prevent export of phosphates, China already
76
recognizes the importance of prolonging reserves of its phosphates.
Adopting sustainable practices should further help China achieve its
goal of resource preservation.
Another challenge in applying the Transnational New
Governance model to the phosphate industry comes from Morocco's

169.
See About Western SaharaResearch Watch (WSRW), W. SAHARA RESOURCE
WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007, 6:22 PM), http://www.wsrw.org/al14x515 (last visited Apr. 19,
2013) (listing Yara as one of the companies that halted phosphate exports from the
Western Sahara due to pressure from the WSRW).
Fertilizer Company "Hopes for Liberation of Western Sahara," W. SAHARA
170.
RESOURCE WATCH (Feb. 15, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://www.wsrw.org/al41x1067 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2013).
See Graham & Woods, supra note 126, at 871-72 (describing pressure
171.
investors apply to firms to encourage the firms' compliance with social and
environmental norms).
172.
See id. (discussing the financial benefits to following strict voluntary social
and environmental codes and the success that shareholder advocates have had in
inducing social and environmental reforms within firms).
173.
See id. at 870 (discussing the theory that in order to succeed, self-regulation
must be in a firm's self-interest).
Lougheed, supra note 19, at A209.
174.
Esler & White, supra note 1.
175.
See id. (discussing the 135-percent tariff that China levied on phosphate
176.
exports in 2008).
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near monopoly in global phosphate exports.1 77 And, to make matters
worse, there is a monopoly within a monopoly, since OCP, a Moroccan
government agency that will soon be converted into a limited
company,' 78 has full control of Morocco's phosphates.' 79 When, or if,
the world depends primarily on Morocco's phosphates, phosphate
importers will have no leverage to demand sustainable and ethical
practices from OCP. However, exploring the current global phosphate
trade and calculating remaining reserves in other countries reveals
that there is sufficient time to prevent an OCP monopoly. During this
time, and because of the importance of Moroccan phosphates to both
the global phosphate market and to the Moroccan economy,
international phosphate firms should be able to pressure OCP into
joining the Transnational New Governance scheme and adopting
sustainable and ethical practices.
Presently, Morocco only produces 15 percent of the world's
phosphates. 8 0 Based on the lifetimes of other countries' reserves,
there is still time before OCP has a monopoly on phosphates.18 1
Furthermore, many phosphate importers have recently focused on
exploiting phosphates from countries with smaller reserves. For
example, a Chinese firm recently completed a mining project in Saudi
Arabia;182 the European Union imports most of its phosphates from
Russia; 8 3 India recently incorporated a joint-venture company for
phosphate mining in Jordan;184 and Vale, a Brazil-based mining firm,
is currently operating mines in Peru and Mozambique. 8 5 Thus, the
current global phosphate trade is not highly dependent on OCP's
phosphates and allows for importers to circumvent Moroccan
phosphate imports to put pressure on OCP to adopt sustainable and
ethical practices.
Of equal importance, OCP is an integral part of the global
phosphate trade. The United States imports approximately 10

177.
178.

Vaccari, supra note 29.
MoRocco MINING LAWS AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at

43.
179.
Id. at 38.
180.
Gabel, supra note 165.
181.
The United States' most productive phosphate reserve, for example, has an
expected lifetime of twenty more years. Esler & White, supra note 1.
182.
Wengfu Group, LEGEND INT'L HOLDINGS INC., http://1gdi.net/wengful (last
visited Apr. 10, 2013).
183.
See, e.g., EUROCHEM, RESILIENCE GROWTH STABILITY: ANNUAL REPORT AND
ACCOUNTS 2010, at 10, 19 (2010) (describing Russia as EuroChem's "core" and "target"
market).
184.
Press Release, Indian Farmers Fertiliser Coop. Ltd. [IFFCO], IFFCO's JV
"Jordan India Fertilizer Company" To Assure Phosphate Input in India (Oct. 4, 2009),
available at http://www.iffco.nic.in/applications/iffcowebr5.nsf/0/DA7513C5B83325A1
6525764A00389347/?OpenDocument.
185.
Vale Across the World, VALE, http://www.vale.com/en/aboutvale/acrossworld/pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
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percent of its phosphate needs from Morocco. 186 Brazil relies heavily
on Moroccan phosphates.1 8 7 New Zealand, Colombia, Australia,
Mexico, Spain, and Turkey also receive phosphate imports from
Morocco.1 88 Because Morocco depends on phosphate demand from
many countries, changes in consumer or firm preferences in any one
of these countries can help influence OCP practices.
Finally, because Morocco's phosphate reserves are critical to its
economy, Morocco will be especially sensitive to consumer and firm
demands. Morocco's mining industry employs approximately sixty
thousand people, represents almost one-third of export earnings, and
contributes 3 percent of the nation's gross domestic product. 8 9 A
decrease in demand for phosphates could have a critical effect on the
Moroccan people and economy, so the Moroccan government is likely
to respond to demands for sustainability.
Thus, the unique positions of the United States, China, and
Morocco in the global phosphate trade should not present an
insurmountable threat to successful implementation of the
Transnational New Governance model. While the countries have the
opportunity to exclude themselves from the sustainability scheme,
they may nonetheless participate because of reputational and
financial pressures, their economic interests in implementing
sustainability regulations, and, in the case of Morocco, pressure from
consumers.
a.

What the Model Would Look Like for the Phosphate Industry

Experts in the field have stressed that the future of phosphates
depends on eliminating losses at all stages between "farm and
fork." 190 Thus, under the Transnational New Governance model,
traditional actors in the phosphate cycle, including mining firms,
fertilizer producers, retailers, and farmers, as well other interested
parties, including banks, investors, and NGOs,1'9 would come
together to implement sustainability measures during phosphate92
rock mining, fertilizer production, and fertilizer application.1
Like other Transnational New Governance models, the scheme
for the phosphate industry would rely on a system of sustainability

Esler & White, supra note 1, at 2.
186.
187.
Gabel, supra note 165.
See W. SAHARA RESOURCE WATCH, supra note 106 (view The "Companies"
188.
menu) (listing specific firms that have imported phosphate from the Western Sahara).
1 INT'L Bus. PUBL'NS, supranote 77, at 43.
189.
See Cordell, Drangert & White, supra note 3, at 296 (suggesting that
190.
"approximately 55% of all phosphorus in food is lost between 'farm and fork"').
191.
The proposed members of the phosphate roundtable parallel those present
in the RSPO model. See Who Is RSPO?, supra note 154 (discussing RSPO).
See Syers et al., supra note 14, at 42-44 (discussing means of minimizing
192.
phosphorus losses).
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certification for all processes in the supply chain. Interested NGOs
should meet with phosphate industry firms at a roundtable and
collectively agree on a set of sustainability standards required for a
phosphate-mining firm, a fertilizer-manufacturing firm, or a farmer
seeking
"sustainable phosphate"
certification.
Sustainability
certification for phosphate-mining firms should require the firm to
recover phosphates from the waste stream, implement practices to
minimize soil erosion, and recycle processing water.1 93 Fertilizer
manufacturers seeking certification should be required to capture and
reuse waste heat, reclaim waste byproducts, and efficiently ship their
products. Finally, for farmers, sustainability certification should
require runoff treatment or recycling, as well as regular testing of soil
nutrient levels to avoid fertilizer overapplication. 9 4 The certification
standards should be flexible, yielding to the needs of individual
parties, so as not to exclude members with special needs, such as
small-scale farmers in developing countries. 19 5
The strength of the Transnational New Governance program for
the phosphate industry would come from an understanding that
certified members deal only with other certified members across the
supply chain, thus guaranteeing a sustainable end product for
consumers. The arrangement would also serve to make sustainable
phosphate certification a demanded status in the industry, as
certified members would pressure their suppliers and consumers to
become certified. To allow for transparency and greater credibility in
the certification program, NGOs would serve as inspectors.' 9 6 The
NGOs would verify that a firm meets certification requirements and
should periodically inspect certified firms to ensure that they are
continuing to implement sustainability measures and that they are
only dealing with other certified members across the supply chain.19 7
As a final step towards increased credibility, NGOs would publish
inspection results and decertify members that are in noncompliance
with the terms of certification.1 98

193.
See Syers et al., supra note 14, at 42-44 (noting that "major gains can be
made through improving plant nutrient management and recycling phosphorus from
waste streams").
194.
Hannah Hislop & Julie Hill, Reinventing the Wheel: A CircularEconomy for
Resource Scarcity, GREEN ALLIANCE, Oct. 2011, at 32.
195.
See Smallholder Task Force, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL,
http://www.rspo.org/en/smallholders-task-force (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (explaining
a parallel requirement in the RSPO).
196.
This requirement is based off a similar requirement in the RSPO. See How
To Be RSPO Certified, supra note 12 (presenting the process for RSPO certification).
197.
Cf. id. (demonstrating procedural similarities).
198.
See Supply Chain Certification (Expired), ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE
PALM OIL, http://www.rspo.org/en/supply-chain -certification&op=hidden (last updated
Mar. 4, 2013) (providing an example of publishing certified members.)
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NEW GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK IN THE PHOSPHATE INDUSTRY

V. IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSNATIONAL

To further illustrate that the Transnational New Governance
model is appropriate for the phosphate industry, this Part walks
through each step in the phosphate industry's adoption of the model.

A. Initiating Collective Standard Setting
Under the Transnational New Governance framework, the first
step towards achieving sustainability in the global phosphate trade is
a roundtable at which key players in the phosphate industry,
including NGOs and firms from each level of the supply chain,
participate in collective standard setting.' 9 9 Because the WWF is a
strong supporter of the Transnational New Governance model
through its Direct Market Transformation Initiative, 20 0 the NGO
should organize the roundtable and invite industry participants and
interested parties to attend. However, firms will only attend the
roundtable and participate in collective standard setting if they have
a vested interest in regulations or an incentive to regulate.2 0 1 Thus,
phosphate firm attendance at the roundtable and participation in the
Transnational New Governance scheme is largely dependent upon
NGOs threatening the firms' reputations and consumers pressuring
the firms into participation. 20 2
Two NGOs that may fulfill the role of forcing firms into
roundtable participation are the WSRW and WWF. 20 In the wake of
increased global access to information, firms worry more about
missteps because having a negative reputation may deter both
investors and consumers, leading to significant economic loss. 204
Large companies, which are commonplace in the phosphate industry
and which often have a well-known "brand," are most susceptible to
reputational threats. 205 In the phosphate industry, these firms have
already demonstrated that they will react to reputational threats. 206

199.
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 506-07 (addressing the roles of
different actors in the regulatory process).
200.
See van Hoeven, supra note 11, at 1 (discussing the WWF's support for
"multi-stakeholder engagements, such as roundtables, market standards and
certification").
201.
See Graham & Woods, supra note 126, at 870 ("Corporations are economic,
not normative actors who will . . . only undertake actions that are in their selfinterest.").
202.
See id. at 870-73 (discussing means to coerce corporations).
203.
Id. at 870.
204.
Id.
205.
Clay, supra note 20.
206.
The Phosphate Exports, supra note 98. For specific examples of firms that
have stopped importing from the Western Sahara, see No More Mosaic, supra note 16
and FertilizerCompany "Hopes for Liberation of Western Sahara,"supra note 170.
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Therefore, if NGOs begin to publicly identify and criticize phosphate
firms that act unsustainably, the NGOs could pressure firms to
protect their reputations by participating in a sustainability
roundtable.
Consumer demand, however, should provide an even stronger
207
incentive to phosphate-firm participation in a roundtable.
Producers' main concern is having business and, thus, being able to
supply a product that the buyer wants. 208 Therefore, when a
consumer demands that a product is produced in a sustainable way, a
supplier will no longer view sustainability measures as an
unnecessary expense, but will conform to sustainable production
standards for the purpose of staying in business. 209
In the phosphate industry, the majority of consumers are local
farmers in developing countries who live on the verge of bankruptcy
and cannot overcome rising fertilizer prices. 210 These farmers have a
strong incentive to demand sustainability in the phosphate industry
because they have been victims of the current, unsustainable
practices in the phosphate industry. 211 For example, phosphatefertilizer prices rose over 350 percent from 2003 to 2008.212 And an
800 percent spike in phosphate prices in 2008213 prevented farmers in
forty countries from purchasing fertilizers and practicing their
livelihood. 214 Moving forward, industry experts expect phosphate
prices only to increase because unsustainable phosphate mining
depends on moving into lower quality reserves that require more
intense mining efforts. 215 Thus, all farmers, and not just those that
are extremely affected by price fluctuations, have an incentive to
demand sustainability from phosphate firms and secure affordable
phosphates in the long-term.
One problem with relying on farmers to demand sustainability of
a supply chain is that the farmers themselves may be resistant to any
program in which they too have to implement costly sustainability
measures to become certified and, thus, to import certified fertilizer.
However, most small-scale farmers are already implementing
sustainable solutions at their level of the phosphate supply chain.
216
Farmers are trained to apply phosphates at time, rate, and place.
And farmers in the United Kingdom, United States, and Japan,

Clay, supra note 20.
207.
Id.
208.
Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 922.
209.
Esler & White, supra note 1, at 2.
210.
See id. at 3 (discussing the possible repercussions of phosphate depletion).
211.
Id. at 2.
212.
Hislop & Hill, supra note 194, at 28.
213.
Esler & White, supra note 1, at 2.
214.
Syers et al., supra note 14, at 37.
215.
See MOSAIc, 2011 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 16 (2011), available at
216.
http://mosaiccosustainability.com/pdfBuilder/1 1111111/2011-Sustainability-Report.pdf
(describing Mosaic's FieldInsite program).
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among other countries, recycle natural phosphorus sources, including
sewage sludge and manure. 2 17 These practices should be sufficient for
farmers to obtain sustainability certification, so farmers should bear
no additional costs in joining the Transnational New Governance
scheme. Thus, farmers should not hesitate to pressure their
phosphate-fertilizer suppliers into attending the roundtable.
Another barrier to relying on farmer demand is that an
individual farmer does not have enough power to shift the practices of
the industry, yet a group of farmers faces a collective-action problem
in organizing itself to present a credible demand to the industry.
However, the farmers' governments, which also have a vested interest
in stabilizing phosphate-fertilizer prices, could overcome the
collective-action problem by organizing and giving credibility to
farmers' demands. In the recent past, food riots-the result of
increased phosphate-fertilizer prices-forced these governments to
spend money to feed their citizens. Since these governments may not
be able to afford, or may not wish to provide, continued food support
as phosphate prices rise, it is in their best interest to assist their
farmers in demanding phosphate-industry sustainability.
Two governments already displayed interest in securing
sustainability in the phosphate industry. First, India created IFFCO
to organize its farmers' interests. IFFCO has explicitly expressed
concern about the increasing price of phosphate fertilizers and the
effects of a future phosphate shortage on India. 218 To secure
phosphate reserves for the Indian people, IFFCO incorporated a new
joint-venture company for phosphate mining in Jordan. 219 Second, the
European Union has expressed a desire to increase sustainability in
the phosphate industry and has already organized its farmers to
implement "end of pipe" phosphate-recycling programs. 220 Because
farmers in India and the European Union already have demanded
sustainability, mining companies in Russia and Jordan that supply
India and the European Union's phosphate fertilizers are likely to
succumb to consumer demand and participate in the initial
roundtable.

217.
Hislop & Hill, supra note 194, at 31.
218.
See Press Release, IFFCO, supra note 184 (announcing a joint venture
between Indian and Jordanian phosphate producers).
219.
Id.
220.
Schroder et al., supra note 33, at 4.
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Mining firms that operate in countries with small reserves and
fertilizer manufacturers that depend on phosphates from small
reserves are also likely to participate in the roundtable. These mining
firms and fertilizer manufacturers should recognize that adopting
sustainability measures is beneficial because the measures will
increase the lifetime of their phosphate reserves, allowing the firms
to remain in business in the long-term. 221 Thus, firms that operate in
countries with smaller reserves, including those in Australia,
Canada, Egypt, Israel, Senegal, Togo, and Tunisia, 222 will likely
attend the roundtable and participate in collective standard setting.
In summary, if WWF were to host a sustainable-phosphate
roundtable and invite firms to collectively set sustainability
standards in the phosphate industry, a variety and multitude of firms
would likely attend the event. While NGOs can pressure all
phosphate firms to participate in the roundtable by publicly
condemning their unsustainable practices, large firms with wellknown "brands," such as Mosaic and PotashCorp, are the most likely
to succumb to the NGO pressure and attend the roundtable. Firms
that operate in Russia and Jordan, including EuroChem and the
Jordan Phosphate Mining Company (JPMC), and that are being
pressured by organized farmers' sustainability demands in the
European Union and India, are also likely to attend the roundtable.
Finally, firms that operate in countries with small phosphate
reserves, such as Vale in Peru and Arafura in Australia, are likely to
participate in the roundtable due to self-interest in sustainability.

B. Hittingthe Threshold Number of PrivateActors
For the global phosphate industry to truly operate sustainably,
virtually all industry actors must adopt sustainable practices.
However, under the Transnational New Governance model, not all
industry actors need to participate in the initial roundtable and
become certified immediately. Previous applications of the model
suggest instead that once a threshold number of industry members
are certified, certification becomes necessary for survival in the
industry, and firms across the industry universally demand the
status. 223 In previous applications of the model, the threshold level
has been somewhere between 40 and 80 percent of all the firms in the
industry. 224 Given that the number of phosphate-industry members
that participate in the roundtable and in early sustainability

221.
It should be noted, however, that adopting sustainable practices may cause
costs to increase in the short term.
222.
See USGS, supra note 17, at 118 (displaying phosphate-mine production
and reserves by country).
223.
Clay, supra note 20.
224.
Id.
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certification is likely to fall short of this threshold, meeting the
threshold and achieving universal industry sustainability depends on
demand for certification spreading beyond the roundtable
participants. Under the Transnational New Governance model,
demand for certification should spread both through the phosphatefertilizer supply chain and through other industry pressures.2 2 5
Even after only a few firms in the phosphate industry have
sustainable-phosphate certification, the demand for certification
should naturally spread throughout the global phosphate industry
because most industry actors have supply agreements with multiple
firms in a variety of countries. The complex web of phosphate firms
and consumers around the world should force a significant number of
industry actors to adopt sustainability certification because of two
requirements: (1) sustainable-phosphate-certified mining companies,
fertilizer manufacturers, and farmers may only contract with other
certified industry members, both up and down the supply chain; and
(2) a phosphate-mining firm or phosphate-fertilizer manufacturer
must verify that all of its phosphate products, not just the products
that are shipped to a particular consumer, are sustainably produced.
Thus, if a significant portion of a phosphate-fertilizer manufacturer's
consumer base demands that it become sustainable-phosphate
certified, the fertilizer manufacturer can influence behavior on both
sides of the supply chain. The firm would necessarily demand
sustainable phosphate certification from (1) each of the mining firms
that supply its phosphate and (2) each of the consumers that
purchase its fertilizer. The certification demand would then spread
even further, as the sustainable-phosphate-certified consumers would
demand that their other fertilizer suppliers seek certification, and
demand
firms would
mining
sustainable-phosphate-certified
to, and
they
export
manufacturers
certification of the other fertilizer
throughout
may
spread
so on. To illustrate how certification demand
the phosphate industry, this Note assumes that the actors identified
as likely roundtable participants in the previous subpart will be
among the first certified members.
In one potential route for the spread of certification demand in
the phosphate industry, EU pressures on European phosphate
suppliers should force EuroChem, a combined phosphate-mining and
in Russia, 226 to achieve
operation
fertilizer- manufacturing
certification because EuroChem is highly dependent on its phosphate
sales in Europe, which make up approximately 20 percent of its total
sales. 227 EuroChem's sustainability certification could stimulate
farmer certification in each of the places where it sells phosphate
fertilizers, including Russia, Asia, Latin America, North America,

225.
226.
227.

Id.
EUROCHEM, supra note 183, at 22.
Id at 32.
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and Africa.22 8 Once these farmers become certified, they could
demand sustainability of all their other fertilizer suppliers, who could
continue the spread of demand for certification across the supply
chain.
In another potential route for the spread of certification demand,
IFFCO's pressures on its phosphate suppliers should first affect
JPMC, which has a supply agreement and a joint-venture company
with IFFCO. 2 29 If JPMC becomes sustainable-phosphate certified, it
could then demand that Israel Chemicals (ICL), a major producer of
fertilizers in the Middle East, 230 become certified. ICL next could
demand certification of its other phosphate suppliers in the Middle
East and its consumer farmers in the Americas, Western Europe, and
South Asia.2 3 ' These farmers and mining firms could then continue
the spread of certification demand back up and down the supply
chain.
In a final example, Incitec Pivot Limited (IPL), an Australian
phosphate-mining firm, 232 is likely to be self-interested in
certification because it depends on a small phosphate reserve. IPL's
certification should pressure its consumer farmers in Australia,
North America, South America, and China to become certified.2 33
IPL's Australian farmers alone could demand certification from
Union Resources Limited, an Australian firm that has a joint venture
with Minemakers Limited and Tungeni Investments in Namibia, 234
and Phosphate Australia Limited, an emerging phosphate-mining
firm in Australia. 235 In turn, these firms could continue the onward
spread of certification demand.
While it appears that the phosphate supply chain alone should
effectively spread demand for certification, one final effort to achieve
widespread certification in the phosphate industry could be through
the CEOs of sustainable-phosphate-certified companies.2 36 The CEOs
could "twist the arms" of noncertified industry players.2 37
Encouragement from industry peers has been particularly effective in

228.
Id.
Press Release, IFFCO, supra note 184.
229.
230.
Sebastien Chu Ti, World Phosphate Rock Production Grew Steadily and
Volumes Recovered in 2010-So Who's Making Money?, INTEGER (June 10, 2011),
http://www.integer-research.com/201 1/fertilizers-chemicals/news/world-phosphaterock-production-grown-steadily/.
231.
Id.
SHARES,
IPL,
AUSTRALIAN
Incitec
Pivot
Limited-ASX
232.
http://www.australian-shares.com/mining/IPL (last updated Aug. 10, 2011).
233.
Id.
SHARES,
UCL,
AUSTRALIAN
Limited-ASX:
Resources
234.
UCL
http://www.australian-shares.com/mining/UCL (last updated Dec. 21, 2011).
SHARES,
POZ, AUSTRALIAN
235.
Phosphate Australia Limited-ASX:
http://www.australian-shares.com/mining/POZ (last updated Feb. 28, 2011).
236.
Clay, supra note 20.
237.
Id.
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past applications of the Transnational New Governance model
because it eliminates the most common excuse that industry
members have for not seeking sustainability certification: they are
concerned about working with NGOs since they have not worked with
them before and have no idea what to expect.238
Thus, even if few firms in the phosphate-fertilizer industry
become certified right away, these firms and their CEOs can spread
demand for certification throughout the industry so that, eventually,
the threshold level of actors is certified and the industry achieves
true sustainability. Tracking three presumed starting points for
certification demand-the European Union, India, and Australiaillustrates that a single certified firm could force a variety of industry
actors around the world to seek certification. Because a multitude of
firms will likely seek sustainable-phosphate certification shortly after
the roundtable, 2 39 the certification should rapidly and extensively
spread across the global phosphate industry, quickly achieving the
end goal of sustainability in the phosphate industry.
C. Ensuring ProperLevels of Compliance
For the Transnational New Governance scheme to achieve
sustainability, it cannot allow firms to greenwash, or claim that they
are acting sustainably while they are, in fact, only concealing their
unsustainable practices. 240 In the phosphate industry, there is a high
risk of greenwashing among mining corporations because phosphate
mines are located far from not only the importers and consumers that
demand sustainability, but typically also from population centers. 241
In order to prevent greenwashing and ensure that sustainability
practices are being carried out, there must be both a strong demand
for credible information 242 and a system of credibility within the
certification program.2 43
Current technology alone may be enough to prevent firms from
greenwashing. 244 Increased global access to information 245 makes the
threat of being exposed a serious risk for a corporation, which would

238.
Id.
239.
See supra Part V.A.
240. - Vandenbergh, supra note 85, at 949.
241.
For example, the Bou Craa mine is only connected to civilization through
the world's longest conveyor belt. The PhosphateExports, supra note 98.
242.
See Graham & Woods, supra note 126, at 874 (noting the need for increased
corporate disclosures).
243.
In RSPO, this system exists through NGO credibility checks. How To Be
RSPO Certified, supra note 12.
244.
See Graham & Woods, supra note 126, at 874 (discussing the globalreporting initiative's potential to encourage firms to self-report and incentivize green
practices).
245.
Id. at 870.
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jeopardize losing business to the benefit of its competitors. 246 And
WSRW has proven to the phosphate industry that even the most
remote of industry activity, mining in the middle of the Sahara
Desert, can be tracked and exposed. 247 Aware both that they are
being watched and that the consequences of being exposed are severe,
phosphate firms are less likely to act in bad faith.
Furthermore, under the sustainable- phosphate -certification
model, NGOs would regularly inspect the mines, manufacturing
facilities, and farms of certified members to ensure that the members
meet and maintain sustainability requirements.248 NGOs would
publish inspection results and decertify members that are not
complying with the terms of certification. 249 The system of
transparency and credibility within the Transnational New
Governance model for the phosphate industry would ensure that no
greenwashing is permitted.

VI. CONCLUSION

Although world actors have begun to recognize the severity and
urgency of the looming phosphate shortage, their proposed solutions
thus far have failed because they have not recognized and accounted
for the powerlessness of IGOs and the natural incentives of
phosphate controllers to resist regulations. This Note argues that
Transnational New Governance is the only feasible solution to the
phosphate shortage because it is the only one that escapes the
traditional regulatory framework and relies on concerned actors to
change the incentive structure within the industry so that phosphatecontrolling firms will want to adopt sustainability measures. While
some characteristics of the phosphate industry should facilitate the
industry's adoption of the Transnational New Governance scheme,
the unique distribution of global phosphate reserves also presents
challenges that NGOs must overcome to successfully implement the
model. But if NGOs can leap these hurdles, the result will be (1) a
WWF-hosted roundtable at which NGOs and industry actors come
together to collectively set sustainability standards for the phosphate
industry; (2) a certification program that allows firms that adopt the
agreed-upon sustainability standard to produce sustainable-certified
phosphates, a product that is demanded by consumers around the

Id.
246.
247.
See The Phosphate Exports, supra note 98 (discussing efforts by WSRW to
observe unethical activities in the Western Sahara).
248.
In RSPO, "growers will be assessed for certification once every five years,
and if certified, will be annually assessed for continued compliance." How To Be RSPO
Certified, supranote 12.
249.
See id. (proscribing how, in RSPO, NGOs are held to standards of
accountability).
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world; and (3) the spread of certification throughout the industry
until all firms are acting sustainably and the threat of a phosphate
shortage is a thing of the past.
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